Reform Of Law Enforcement Agencies: Georgia’s MIA Since 2003 – Analysis

In this research article, we show the main factors (positive and negative) that have affected the reform of Georgia’s law enforcement agencies, and indicate which stages brought the most results, opportunities and or risks for reforms of the country’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) after 2003, and the bloodless ‘Rose Revolution’.

Introduction – Aims Of The Research

The relevance of our topic stems from the fact that we can make recommendations for potential reformers, so that they do not make the same tactical and or strategic mistakes. It will be a kind of guidebook that describes the positive and negative aspects of reform in law enforcement agencies. We will use base criteria for assessing the success of reform of law enforcement agencies, using the example of the reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia since 2003.

This case will help us to understand what mistakes have been made, so that these mistakes can be avoided in the future, and what will additionally have to be done during the implementation of reforms in the security services. In the process of analysis, we have the following questions:

• What factors influence the course of the police reform in Georgia?
• How should the state should respond to them?

The purpose and the task of this research work is to understand what are the main factors (positive and negative) that affect the reform of law enforcement agencies are. We aim to create an efficiency scale of qualified implementation of the reform. In this process, we need to identify factors (what was holding back and/or what stimulated the process) which influenced the effectiveness of the police reforms. To find out which stages brought the most results, and of course to allocate similar factors and types already existing in other countries, as in Georgia.

The subject and object of our research topic which we are investigating is structural changes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. The MIA was completely destroyed and rebuilt from scratch on the ruins of an old corrupt machine, and after 2003 a new progressive structure was constructed. But during the reform process it is possible that some errors were made, and as such we are going to in this particular work explore and analyze in the process in detail. Describing step-by-step the structural MIA reforms we are based in our work on the international experience and sources.

Certainly, in the academic world definitely there are a lot of research articles and works, which are related to detailed analysis of the reforms in the field of police and security agencies, but our work is different from all of the others as in Georgia the reform began immediately after the bloodless ‘Rose revolution’ made by Mikheil Saakashvili in 2003. The novelty and originality in this work lies in the fact, that we in our work are going to formulate a scale of reform implementation efficiency by state power structures. This will be a kind of roadmap for comparison of the prosperity of the implementation of reforms for all countries who conduct similar reforms.

Literature Review And Theoretical Discussion

At that time (in the whole decade of 90s), proceeding from the extreme difficult situation in the country, especially in the field of security “. . .organized crime is able to assert control at all governmental levels by infiltrating governmental structures . . . once this infiltration has occurred, presidential, executive and legislative branches of government are unable or unwilling to protect citizens”1, we can safely assert without any exaggeration that Georgia needed urgent, profound and totally deep structural changes in all spheres, but especially in the sphere of law enforcement agencies and police, reform and structural changes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia.

The MIA was completely destroyed and rebuilt from the scratch on the ruins of an old corrupt machine, and after 2003 a new progressive structure was constructed. “Police reform has been seen as an opportunity to change the whole culture of policing in Georgia and has been developed in conformity with the principles of democratic policing: emphasis on respect for citizen’s rights and freedom, service to and protection of communities”2. Remembering what happened before the bloodless ‘Rose revolution’ we can simply say that “Till 2004, the Georgian police system belonged to this very type … The police work was directed not towards protecting the public interest, but towards providing its own wellbeing. Protecting the interests of the ruling elite by constant coercion on various groups, was also part of the police job description”.3

This can be described as dark times for the state that existed before 2003, we can describe that as “Predatory policing is when police activities are devoted mainly to the material enrichment of the police themselves and political elites, rather than the protection of the public … is a system of governance where access to state services and offices is not made according to “needs” or “what you know” but “who you know”.4

And we see that after some time in the period 2004-2006, everything begins to change in the police, it was not easy and not so simple. We understand that in order to carry out radical reforms that speed is very necessary, but as a result of this speed we have the possibility of making some mistakes.

“Speed was of paramount importance, however, and initial recruits received just 10 days of instruction before being deployed on the streets with only a skeletal understanding of basic policing skills … international adviser who was involved in the process described the unpreparedness of the new officers as “simply unbelievable”.5

As one of the leading reformers Batu Kutelia said:

“One of my friends compared our situation to building a ship in the middle of the sea while sailing, while also learning how to sail, and while you have somebody attacking and trying to sink your ship. That was the reality”,6 ….  “System changes can only have the effects expected of them given the simultaneous presence of other factors . . . especially public pressure . . . and an “appropriate” political culture”.7

The financial aid factor was one of the key aspects, and played a leading role in the success of the reform of the police and, in general, the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a whole. Immediately after the revolution, detentions of persons illegally appropriating state money began. Utiashvili explained for example to us:

“You misappropriated a million dollars; the police detain you; you pay back the damage to the country that is already proven, but you don’t go to jail; you remain free. That’s what we decided. It was a delicate issue. … Some of that money went to the national budget, and some of that went into this Law Enforcement Development Fund”.8

The Law Enforcement Development Fund closed down in 2006. Thus, the country returned hundreds of millions of dollars to the country’s budget “… hundreds of millions US dollars were returned to the state budget … confiscated financial resources and assets in Georgia have been used for the implementation of reforms and urgent socioeconomic needs”.9

The financial assistance and support from international foundations and donors still played a key role “Three donor organizations were involved in providing advice on police reform after the Rose Revolution: the European Commission (EC), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and USAID”10 …. We can say that between 2003 and 2004 the United States Agency for International Development “…supported reform of the Police Academy with USD 500,000 in 2004”.11

‘The first short-term police assistance project (STAP) was implemented from September 2005 to March 2006 by the OSCE. This was followed by the Police Assistance Programme (PAP) in 2006 and 2007, which focused on three main areas: community policing, human resources management, and police training”. 12 …. “Supplemental funding for police salaries came from the United Nations Development Programme and EU governments, as well as from a Soros Foundation fund that existed for a year after the 2003 regime change”13…. “ … under the Freedom Support Act, the US government delivered a total of $86.5M worth of aid to Georgia in 2005-2006”14 …. “with the largest part of this package distributed thru Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) for targeted programs like the Georgian Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE)”. 15 ….“The GBSLE alone received $15 million dollars in funding plus training, toolkits and equipment ranging from uniforms to helicopters”16 …. “GBSLE was made responsible for overseeing of ten construction sites, including cargo terminals and patrol stations, for a total cost of about $10M”17 and “ … the US equipped Georgian police with computer systems, portable radios and bulletproof vests … received another $5M worth of equipment and supplies”18. In addition, a study was conducted, in the process of which it became clear that during the “ … first step of the reform, it was determined that if MoIA salaries would rise to about $600 on average (and reach into few thousand dollars for high-ranking managers), it should have been possible to find candidates willing to undergo the rigorous selection and training process”.19

The factor of the abolished Traffic Police, was a no less important aspect of the reform of the MIA. It was dissolved in July 2004, and was the most painful part of the reform. The selection and dismissal of the old staff of the MIA was done to break the corrupting chains. We can safely call the traffic police the face of corruption of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the era of the 90s and early 2000s. Utiashvili explains to us how it was in fact:

“What did we achieve by disbanding the Traffic Police? We changed the image. When you change the image, you get support for your reforms … The people saw the corrupt policemen standing on the road, dressed in their dirty uniform, usually weighing more than 100 kilos, unshaved, ugly looking— that was the symbol. We had 15,000 guys like that … Sometimes we fired the people who shouldn’t have been fired … or sometimes I brought in new guys and they did not work very well … If I fired somebody who was potentially good, I could later hear it from many people and I could bring the guy back … Many good people were fired … many people were brought in that we later arrested or fired. But that’s the only way you can do it”.20

But parallel to the ongoing total cleansing and reform in the ministry, in the process, arose another no less important problem. The danger in the form of already dismissed, furious, angry former employees of the MIA. And so there were questions: Where will they go? What will they do? Will they threaten the reforms in the country? And in general, will they potentially threaten the constitutional security in the country? Most foreign advisers and consultants were very worried about this issue. “… international advisers expressed worry over what would become of this group of dismissed officers, the ministry was less concerned”21, but “most of the dismissed officers were happy to go their own way with what effectively amounted to blanket amnesty for past offenses … The alternative was to remain and be subject to an internal investigation of their past conduct … ”. So it was more or less a silent deal “between the ministry and the dismissed”22 said another progressive reformer Tkeshelashvili. Utiashvili pointed out that “’Officers over the retirement age of 55, or with the requisite 20 years of service, were allowed to retire with their pensions … “We were giving them like two months’ salary and everyone saying to them ‘bye-bye.’”23

But there were, as always, exceptions too, explains Utiashvili:

“ … units with specialized skills were given amnesty even if they stayed. “We had to fire some of them that were well known because they were very corrupt or they were torturing people, [but] the others we basically told, ‘What happened, happened. Now we’re giving you much higher salaries, we’ll give you everything you need, and you have to work differently now.’ This was kind of a deal with the old [investigative] policemen””.24

Tkeshelashvili adds, that “They had a chance to stay, and then they had time to prove themselves”. 25 As it was already said by Utiashvili about 15,000 employees were dismissed, but other sources say 16,000. There is no exact figure of the dismissed employees of MIA:

“Some 16,000 officers were dismissed without clear written explanation or a government plan on how to deal with them. The wave of dismissals resulted in protests in the capital Tbilisi and regional towns in 2004 … the method of fighting corruption through sweeping dismissals violated due process rights and led to social unrest.”26

“Such drastic steps were taken despite fears that angry policemen could create security problems in the country, and that there would not be qualified persons to replace them”27. “Lower level police officers, in particular, had trouble finding new jobs and there are reports that former policemen might be linked to organised crime, for example through their involvement in the car trafficking from the EU to Georgia”28. “The ‘shock therapy’ in laying-off so many policemen, sometimes with no clear reason given, shifted a critical mass of those trained in violence from the state into society once again. Fears that ex-policemen would turn to crime, appears, with some exceptions, not to have materialised”29. Integration of former employees of the MIA in other areas of activity occurred, for example where their knowledge and skills were used in particular in private security companies. “Instead, the rapid changes created a ripple in the private security sector with many new private security firms registered and presumably employing ex-policemen”.30

The factor of informal institutions and corruption was very acute during the reign of Shevardnadze “… the causes of corruption are best explained with a cultural/institutional model, which, based in a comparative historical study, stresses the role of political alienation”31. “The problem was rooted in the absence of democratic institutions, especially at the grassroots level, and more broadly, in the absence of a democratic political culture”32, “… alienation that comes as a result of state illegitimacy is the main cause of corruption”.33

The country was in a gray zone, stuck in a criminal and corrupt network of the hopeless poverty “the key roles belonged to Shevardnadze, Jaba Ioseliani and Tengiz Kitovani. Representatives of the Soviet nomenklatura and the criminal community collaborated in a single governing body”34. The police at that time were in fact no different from the criminal, if not even worse “… turmoil in the 1990s, the police themselves were extremely demoralized …Violations of human rights, torture, illegal arrests, extortion of money from business people and criminals, bribery, falsification of the results of investigations, involvement in crimes and assassinations became the usual practice of the police force”.35

Observers for the Georgian development process, all in one voice claimed that “ … local and international observers realized that there was no political will in the country to minimize corruption, a situation which began in the Georgian President’s own office”36. The society matured in 2003 for cardinal reformist changes in Georgia, people simply tired of being part of a backward, corrupt country – society had longed for change. “The Rose Revolution was the first anti-corruption revolution in the former Soviet Union … massive number of arrests of the most corrupt government officials, ‘thieves-in-law’ and other key criminals followed the Rose Revolution in 2003–2005”.37

As understood from above, it is already explained to us that, “During the police reform up to 16,000 policemen were dismissed, which helped quickly destroy corrupt networks and links with criminals inside the law-enforcement structures”38, But unfortunately the government did not create alternative ways for the development of the former employees of the MIA “Despite these reforms, the government did not create efficient social rehabilitation programmes for dismissed policemen, and the training of newly-recruited policemen was very superficial, accomplished in only two to three weeks”39. And therefore there was a high probability of danger that former policemen would go to the criminal world “Many of the dismissed policemen kept their IDs and unregistered guns, and due to their corrupt habits and links to professional criminals, joined the criminal world themselves”.40

Laws that allowed MIA act quickly and effectively were immediately adopted by the State:

“ … adoption of the Law of Georgia on Organized Crime and Racketeering in 2005, enabled law enforcers to arrest tens of influential criminals, including ‘thieves-in-law’, and confiscate their properties … According to the new law, belonging to a criminal organization is punishable by up to six years of jail … ‘thieves-in-law’ was a phrase used in criminal communities, but after debates among legal experts it was included as one of the legal terms in the 2005 Law. Up to 33 ‘thieves-in-law’ were imprisoned after the adoption of this new law in the Parliament of Georgia”.41

The factor of zero tolerance policy for crime, delivered the long and so zealously desired society without criminals, but as always in the process there were also unforeseen circumstances. A major consequence came in the form of overcrowded prisons,

“President Saakashvili declared on March 27, 2006: ‘We have announced a policy of zero tolerance . . . to put an end to petty crime once and for all . . .’, ‘Zero tolerance crime legislation has put large numbers of young people in prison for minor offenses’. As a result, although the crime rate in Georgia has gone down, prisons are overflowing and conditions in them are worsening”.42

We have prepared a table for comparative analysis using a scale of efficiency, for qualified implementation of the MIA reform. We are showing positive and negative factors which affect the process of the creation and development of reform in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Georgia after 2003.

Main Idea And Hypothesis

Proceeding from the above, we have hypotheses which we will be investigated:

Our first hypothetical goal (H1) – is that it is better to understand what factors influence the course of the police reform in Georgia and especially how the state should respond to them.

• a) Our Explanatory factor (X): Factors influence the course of the police reform.
• b) Our Dependent variable (Y): State respond to them.

Our second hypothetical goal (H2) – is that to better understand, how to identify these factors (what was holding back and/or what stimulated the process) which influenced the effectiveness of the police reforms.

• a) Our Explanatory factor (X): Identify holding back and stimulated factors.
• b) Our Dependent variable (Y): Influence on the effectiveness of the police reform.

Analyzing the whole spectrum of this issue, we have the following questions:

1. What are the main factors (positive and negative) that affect the reform of law enforcement agencies?
2. Which stages brought the most results?
3. Which similar types already exist in other countries, as in Georgia?

Table of the comparative analysis of factors

Scale of efficiency for qualified implementation of the reform

Positive factors	Negative factors
I. The financial aid factor. Financial assistance and support from international foundations and donors. 1) European Commission (EC). 2) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 3) EU governments. 4) United Nations Development Progrmme (UN). 5) Soros Foundation. 6) United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 7) US government thru Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). For the success of the reform you need to attract as many donors and special funds as possible.	I. The factor of abolished Traffic Police – during the reform (bad aspect). 1) Where will they go? 2) What will they do? 3) Will they threaten the reform in the country? 4) Will they be a threaten the constitutional security in the country? Government simply did not create alternative ways for the development of the former employees of the MIA. It is necessary to create rehabilitation programs parallel to the reform for former employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Offer to them in the form of an alternative, another place of work, so that they can provide for themselves and their families.
II. The factor of abolished Traffic Police – during the reform (good aspect). This destroyed the chains of corruption.	II. The factor of informal institutions in the MIA. Corruption, nepotism, absence the MIA as state structure, it was not a functioning state institution at all before 2003. For the MIA reform it is necessary to destroy the chains of corruption and create a state institution from the scratch.
III. Factor of zero tolerance to crime (good aspect). End of petty crime.	III. Factor of zero tolerance to crime (bad aspect). Overcrowded prisons – it is necessary to prepare the prisons to expanding numbers of prisoners, or simply create new ones.

 

By doing analysis, we can claim that during the reform of MIA the police must “move from a model of policing based on repression and social control to a model based on prevention and investigation”43. We understand that speed is needed during the implementation of reforms but it is necessary, at the same time be careful, and not to make mistakes “ … the reality is that there is almost no room for error, especially in the early days of police reform, so getting off to a good start is vital and generating early, tangible results is crucial as well”44. “ … police reform must be carried out in tandem with judicial reform … Modernizing laws, training judges, making courts more efficient and humanizing prisons are all part of “rule of law” efforts”45. Another major important problem and challenge is to how get away from dependence on foreign help:

“ … ensure the sustainable generation of financial resources within the state—local taxes and fees—to avoid dependence on foreign largesse … Given the complexity of reform, those with expertise in management, personnel, logistics, communications, procurement, data management, institutional reform, psychology, sociology, criminology, public information campaigns, anthropology and community relations must also participate”.46

“Creating effective disciplinary systems within the police should be a first-order priority”47. It is necessary to create “Effective, transparent and fair accountability mechanisms, both internal and external, will help ensure police discipline and secure public trust”48, “ … key element of success is creating and maintaining a dynamic relationship among the police department, civil society and the oversight body”49. Similar type of Police, as in Georgia already exists in Kosovo “UN and OSCE to build a new rights-respecting and crime-fighting police service in Kosovo … The main finding … is that “a majority of Kosovans now perceives the police as a trusted and credible institution,” and that the [Kosovo Police Service] (KPS) “must further broaden public trust and engage communities through regular dialogue about steps to jointly improve current levels of safety and security”.50

The main positive factor which shown in the table above was, what exactly affects the reform of law enforcement agencies, especially on the police first is money or the financial aid factor – financial assistance and support from international foundations and donors. For the success of the reform we need to attract as many donors and special funds as possible, but over time we must mobilize funds from the country’s budget (in the form of taxes and fees) for funding the Ministry of Internal Affairs, so as not to be always dependent on the international donors. Second positive factor is abolished Traffic Police – during the reform. This destroyed the chains of corruption and nepotism in the MIA system:

“Recruiting must be based on fair, transparent and objective criteria that are publicly announced, and promotions, salary increases, favored postings and other legitimate perks must derive from a rigorously objective assessment of performance, eliminating political favoritism, nepotism and cronyism, which often characterize the ethos of abusive and corrupt police forces”.51

And now the main negative factor which affects the reform of the MIA was the factor of abolished Traffic Police, from the context of bad aspect during the reform. The government simply did not create alternative ways for the development of the former employees of the MIA. We have some serious questions: Where will they go? What will they do? Will they threaten reform in the country? Will they be a threat to the constitutional security in the country? It is necessary to create rehabilitation programs parallel to the reform for former employees of the MIA.

The second negative factor is the factor of informal institutions in the MIA. Corruption, nepotism, absence MIA as state structure, it was not a functioning state institution at all before 2003. For MIA reform it is necessary to destroy the chains of corruption and create a state institution from the scratch:

“Corruption is … problem with police [especially] in post-conflict countries … Poor salaries, for example, do not alone cause corruption, but they can play an important role … The government’s capacity to raise sufficient revenues fairly so that all public servants, including the police, receive an adequate salary, is thus part of an overall context of governance reform that has a huge impact on effective and respectful policing”.52

The most results brought was through the abolishment of the Traffic Police, it was most painful move but most effective way to reform of the Police.

Conclusion And Research Findings

In conclusion we understand, and now can briefly say that the task of our research work was to find out what the main factors (positive and negative), which affect the reform of law enforcement agencies are. We created a kind of efficiency scale which helped us to identify factors which restrained and which stimulated the process and influenced the effectiveness of the police reform.

We discovered that most positive results in police reform (in terms of destroyed the chains of corruption), was brought from the negative stage, which was the total abolishment of the Traffic Police. The financial aid factor with financial assistance and support from international foundations and donors, was a colossal support from international partners. But already now after the police reform nevertheless we still need to develop and improve police effectiveness “analyzing and changing the regulatory and management systems and practices of the police to refine their capabilities and improve their performance, both in effectiveness and ethics”53 …. “It is crucial that reforms realign incentives and punishments to promote integrity and competence in every aspect of the police, so as to embed these values in every procedure and policy”.54

Finally we found out that:

1. Police reform is a process which takes a long time.
2. Organizational structural changes have never been easy especially for the MIA in a post conflict and crisis country such as Georgia.
3. Effective crime and corruption fighting is necessary for development of democracy and for creating an attractive country for tourism and foreign investment.
4. Georgia needs an active process of police and criminal justice institutional development and reform.
5. High responsibility of police administration.
6. We have to emphasize the specificity of history, traditions, culture and mentality. We must take into account all of this during the police reform.
7. International donors and actors should support of the reform.
8. All internal and external factors of police reform should give motivational incentives and resources to fulfill their police duty. Policemen should be independent, objective, transparent and efficient.
9. In the police system there should not be any kind of nepotism or personal or and political favoritism.

*Gevorg Arutinov is a M.A. Researcher in Comparative Politics of Eurasia in Higher School of Economics in National Research University. He currently working on a research in Reforms, Globalisation, Governance local and international, International organisations, UN, Multilateral diplomacy and international negotiation, State-building / sovereignty, Energy, European Union (European integration).

References
1) Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009) Corruption and organized crime in Georgia before and after the ‘Rose Revolution’, p.13. Central Asian Survey, 28:2, 215-234, DOI:10.1080/02634930903043709

2) Bryden A. and M. Caparini (eds) 2006, Private Actors and Security Governance (DCAF) Chapter by Hiscock, D. ‘The Commercialisation of Post-Soviet Private Security’.

3) CRS report to the Congress: U.S. assistance to former Soviet Union, March 1 2007 http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32866.pdf

4) Cablegate: Georgian Border security and Law enforcement Program: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0708/S01934/cablegate-georgia-border-security-and-law-enforcementprogram.Htm

5) Deborah Sander, Ashgate Publishing, “Maritime Power in the Black Sea” pp. 140-141.

6) Daniel Kharitonov: Police Reform in Georgia, LAD CASE STUDY, p.8.

7) David Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It (National Institute of Justice, 2001),op. cit., p. 40.

8) Gavin Slade,2011, p.2. The State on the Streets: the Changing Landscape of Policing in Georgia, CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 26, 26 April 2011.

9) Gordon Peake, Policing the Police: Police Reform Experience in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia (London: Saferworld, 2003), p. 22.

10) John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), p. 119.

11) Krunic, Z and Siradze, G 2005. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia – Report on the current situation with the recommendations for the reform. Report for the European Commission, Tbilisi: January. Available at http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/press/REPORT_ON_MOIA_January-2005.pdf [accessed 1 February 2010].

12) Kupatadze, A, Siradze, G and Mitagvaria, G 2006. Structural Reorganization and Staff Optimization in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TRACCC) Caucasus Office.

13) Lili di Puppo 2010, Police reform in Georgia Cracks in an anti-corruption success story,p.3. U4 PRACTICE Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

14) Lovseth, T., 2001. Corruption and alienation. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, April 2001,p.2. Grenoble: Panel 16: ‘Corruption, Scandal and the Contestation of Governance in Europe’, Available from: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble/ws16/lovseth.pdf [Accessed 19 April 2009].

15) Matthew Devlin, 2010. Seizing the reform moment: rebuilding Georgia’s Police, 2004-2006 / Innovations for Successful Societies, p.6.

16) Newell, J., 2004. Institutional reform and attempts to fight corruption: the Italian case. In: P. C. Van Duyne, et al., eds. Threats and phantoms of organized crime, corruption and terrorism. Critical European perspectives. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal. p.224.

17) Rachel Neild, Police Training: Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for Civil Society (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998), p. 11.

18) Rachel Neild, Themes and Debates in Public Security Sector Reform: A Manual for Civil Society: Internal Controls and Disciplinary Units (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998), p. 1.

19) Shelley, Louise.I., 2000. Post-Soviet organized crime: a new form of authoritarianism. In: P. Williams, ed. Russian organized crime: the new threat? London: Frank Cass.p.127.

20) Tamar Charkviani, 2014, The Police System Reform in Georgia (Informal power its forms, types and spheres of influence) p.2. / De Gruyter DOI: 10.2478/ijas-2014-0007.

21) Theodore, P.G., and Sarah E., 2008. Mendelson Public Experiences of Police Violence and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing? Law and Society Review, 42(1), p.2.

22) Transparency International (TI) Georgia 2005:2, Reform of law enforcement bodies in Georgia. Tbilisi.

23) US Department of State: INL/Georgia Program http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/178347.htm

24) UNDP, Light Blue: Perceptions of Security and Police Performance in Kosovo (June 2004), p.13.

25) William G. O’Neill, April 2005, Report policy paper, New York, The Security-Development Nexus Program, Police reform in post-conflict societies: what we know and what we still need to know. p.3. This report can be accessed online at: www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseSecDev_Pub.ht

Endnotes:
1. Shelley, Louise.I., 2000. Post-Soviet organized crime: a new form of authoritarianism. In: P. Williams, ed. Russian organized crime: the new threat? London: Frank Cass.p.127.
2. Tamar Charkviani, 2014, The Police System Reform in Georgia (Informal power its forms, types and spheres of influence) p.2. / De Gruyter DOI: 10.2478/ijas-2014-0007
3. Theodore, P.G., and Sarah E., 2008. Mendelson Public Experiences of Police Violence and Corruption in Contemporary Russia: A Case of Predatory Policing? Law and Society Review, 42(1), p.2.
4. Ibid, Tamar Charkviani, 2014, p.2.
5. Matthew Devlin, 2010. Seizing the reform moment: rebuilding Georgia’s Police, 2004-2006 Innovations for Successful Societies, p.6.
6. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, interviews conducted in the Republic of Georgia during May 2009, p.1. Seizing the reform moment: rebuilding Georgia’s Police2004-2006 Innovations for Successful Societies, 2010.
7. Newell, J., 2004. Institutional reform and attempts to fight corruption: the Italian case. In: P. C. Van Duyne, et al., eds. Threats and phantoms of organized crime, corruption and terrorism. Critical European perspectives. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal. p.224.
8. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, interviews p.9.
9. Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009) Corruption and organized crime in Georgia before and after the ‘Rose Revolution’, p.13. Central Asian Survey, 28:2, 215-234, DOI:10.1080/02634930903043709
10. Lili di Puppo 2010, Police reform in Georgia Cracks in an anti-corruption success story,p.3. U4 PRACTICE Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.
11. Transparency International (TI) Georgia 2005:2, Reform of law enforcement bodies in Georgia. Tbilisi.
12. Ibid, Lili di Puppo 2010,p.3.
13. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, 2010. Seizing the reform moment: rebuilding Georgia’s Police, 2004-2006 Innovations for Successful Societies, p.8.
14. CRS report to the Congress: U.S. assistance to former Soviet Union, March 1 2007
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32866.pdf
15. US Department of State: INL/Georgia Program http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/178347.htm
16. Deborah Sander, Ashgate Publishing, “Maritime Power in the Black Sea” pp. 140-141
17. Cablegate: Georgian Border security and Law enforcement Program: http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WL0708/S01934/cablegate-georgia-border-security-and-law-enforcementprogram.Htm
18. Daniel Kharitonov: Police Reform in Georgia, LAD CASE STUDY, p.8.
19. Ibid, Daniel Kharitonov, p.4.
20. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, interviews p.4,5.
21. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, p.7.
22. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, interviews p.7.
23. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, interviews p.7.
24. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, interviews p.7.
25. Ibid, Matthew Devlin, interviews p.7.
26. Ibid, Lili di Puppo 2010, p.5.
27. Krunic, Z and Siradze, G 2005. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia – Report on the current situation with the recommendations for the reform. Report for the European Commission, Tbilisi: January. Available at http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/press/REPORT_ON_MOIA_January-2005.pdf [accessed 1 February 2010].
28. Kupatadze,A, Siradze, G and Mitagvaria, G 2006. Structural Reorganization and Staff Optimization in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TRACCC) Caucasus Office.
29. Gavin Slade,2011, p.2. The State on the Streets: the Changing Landscape of Policing in Georgia, CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 26, 26 April 2011.
30. Bryden A. and M. Caparini (eds) 2006, Private Actors and Security Governance (DCAF) Chapter by Hiscock, D. ‘The Commercialisation of Post-Soviet Private Security’.
31. Lovseth, T., 2001. Corruption and alienation. Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, April 2001,p.2. Grenoble: Panel 16: ‘Corruption, Scandal and the Contestation of Governance in Europe’, Available from: http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/grenoble/ws16/lovseth.pdf [Accessed 19 April 2009].
32. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.5.
33. Ibid, Lovseth, T., 2001 , p.20.
34. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.6.
35. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.8.
36. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.9.
37. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.12.
38. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.15.
39. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.15.
40. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.15.
41. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.15.
42. Ibid, Alexandre Kukhianidze (2009), p.16.
43. Rachel Neild, Police Training: Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for Civil Society (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998), p. 11.
44. John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), p. 119.
45. William G. O’Neill, April 2005, Report policy paper, New York, The Security-Development Nexus Program, Police reform in post-conflict societies: what we know and what we still need to know. p.3. This report can be accessed online at: www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseSecDev_Pub.htm
46. Ibid, William G. O’Neill, 2005, p.5,6.
47. David Bayley, Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It (National Institute of Justice, 2001),op. cit., p. 40.
48. Ibid, William G. O’Neill, 2005, p.7.
49. “Policing in Democratic Societies,” The Vera Institute of Justice, available at http://www.vera.org/project/project1_1.asp?section_id=2&project_id=31
50. UNDP, Light Blue: Perceptions of Security and Police Performance in Kosovo (June 2004), p.13.
51. Ibid, William G. O’Neill, 2005, p.9.
52. Ibid, William G. O’Neill, 2005, p.10.
53. Rachel Neild, Themes and Debates in Public Security Sector Reform: A Manual for Civil Society: Internal Controls and Disciplinary Units (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998), p. 1.
54. Gordon Peake, Policing the Police: Police Reform Experience in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia (London: Saferworld, 2003), p. 22.