China’s Space Race Surge – OpEd

China has accomplished a significant breakthrough in the global space race with the launch of its largest rocket, the Long March-5, carrying the Chang’e-6 lunar probe. The whole world was engrossed in the launch that happened at 5:27 pm (09:27 GMT) on Friday from the Wenchang Space Launch Centre in Hainan province. Titled after the Chinese mythical moon goddess, the Chang’e-6 mission is a nearly two-month voyage. The far side of the moon, often referred to as the “dark side,” presents unique scientific opportunities due to its relative isolation from Earth’s electromagnetic interference. By collecting samples from this region, Chang’e-6 will be the first lunar sampling and return mission on the far side of the moon in human history, contributing to the broader scientific understanding of lunar evolution. The mission aims to achieve a world-first status for China and signify its growing capabilities in space exploration. On the political canvas, this technical advancement also elucidates the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as an innovative, science-driven political entity at the domestic and international levels.   

Chang’e-6 is the second mission to land on the lunar far side, following the successful touchdown of Chang’e-4 in 2019. This mission will enable access to vital resources like water (present in ice form), helium-3, and rare Earth minerals.  Initially constructed as a contingency for the Chang’e-5 mission, which returned 1.73 kilograms of lunar regolith from the near side of the Moon in 2020, Chang’e-6 represents a continuation of China’s ambitious lunar exploration efforts. This endeavor aligns with China’s long-term objectives of establishing a permanent lunar research station, conducting manned lunar landings by 2030, and eventually exploring Mars.

The technical support systems provided by different countries for the mission in general and Pakistan’s (iCube Qamar satellite) for collecting samples, in particular, make China a more attractive partner for future international collaborations. The (iCube Qamar) satellite, equipped with two optical cameras, would capture detailed images of the lunar surface and gather valuable data cost-effectively. This initiative would significantly benefit emerging space engineers at SPARCO and IST by granting them access to valuable satellite data and space infrastructure. Such access would also enable these engineers to enhance their technical expertise and develop their capabilities within the space sector. This inclusion of payloads from other countries on the mission reflects China’s inclusive approach toward its partners and, thus enhancing its diplomatic relations and partnerships. 

However, striking an equilibrium between protecting national interests and exchanging scientific expertise is crucial for a country’s scientific advancement vis-a-vis national security. For China, this balance is particularly substantial given its aspirations to become a global leader in science and technology. China’s foreign policy emphasizes cooperation and win-win outcomes, which is reflected in its approach to international scientific collaboration. These collaborations can drive innovation, enhance scientific understanding, and solve challenges on both regional and global levels more effectively.

Moreover, private space companies in China have increasingly taken on roles in the national space program, spurred by government encouragement and investment. Over the past seven years, these companies have benefited from supportive policies, capital, and technology. The Chinese government has implemented measures to boost government procurement of spacecraft, improve infrastructure, and enhance military-civilian integration, fostering the growth of the commercial aerospace industry through market-oriented strategies. Such initiatives would further strengthen China’s aim of ‘Global Development Initiative’.

From 2015 to 2020, China’s commercial aerospace industry saw exponential growth, with market size rising from 376.4 billion yuan ($59.09 billion) to 1.02 trillion yuan ($160.13 billion), at a compound growth rate of 22.04 percent, according to the China Astronautics Association for Quality (CAAQ). During this period, more than ten commercial rocket companies were established, specializing in various rocket manufacturing and operation aspects.

The Western states and the US have already expressed their concerns about China’s growing capabilities in space missions. The statement by NASA’s Administrator Mr. Bill Nelson hints at the riddles in the minds of US policymakers. In their reckoning, China’s space program “ostensibly presented as civilian” might have significant military dimensions. Contraire, China in a position paper submitted to the UN in March 2024, already had outlined its lunar exploration plans through the Chang’e-8 mission for resource utilization. China’s position paper emphasized adherence to the regulation and non-appropriation principles of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 while asserting that space resource utilization is legal within the OST’s confines. However, China’s plan to establish a permanent lunar base by 2036 is viewed particularly in the U.S., as a leap towards rapid advancements in space technology and its potential military implications. 

Looking to the future, the dynamics of global space exploration could evolve in complex ways. This might heighten tensions and rivalries among space-faring nations. It will ensue supposedly space weaponization, the militarization of space, or even entail conflicts over lunar resources and territory. While it is challenging to predict the exact trajectory of future global wars in space, it is clear that the growing competition and strategic significance of space exploration will continue to shape geopolitical dynamics in the years to come. It is important to understand that the role of international cooperation and diplomacy would be instrumental in ensuring that space remains a domain of peaceful exploration and scientific advancement rather than conflict and competition.

The author is working as a research intern in the China Pakistan Study Center (CPSC) at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. The opinions expressed in the articles are those of the author and do not represent the views of ISSI.