Rags To Riches: How The Houthis Built Capacity Using The War In Gaza – Analysis

By Kabir Taneja

In 2015, as war ravaged Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world, India launched Operation Rahat aimed to evacuate its citizens as the country’s capital Sana’a and its airport came under Houthi control. The Houthis back then, were comparatively ragtag when it came to actual military and militant capacities. Today, nine months since Hamas’s terror attack and Israel’s retaliatory war in Gaza, the Houthis have arguably become one of the biggest beneficiaries.

The Houthi movement, formerly officially known as Ansarallah, has its roots in an armed and political ideation which champions Yemen’s ethnic Shia Muslim minorities, the Zaidis. The ideology was founded by Hussein al-Houthi (assassinated in 2004) and is currently led by his brother, Abdul-Malik-al-Houthi. The histography of Ansarallah is similar to other Shia minority groups around the region. Al-Houthi fought against the long-standing government of Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh (who was killed in a Houthi ambush in 2017). 

The war in Gaza

The Houthis officially recognise themselves as part of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’, a constellation of groups aided by Iran, largely working against Israel and the United States (US). However, the Houthis also fought a war against Saudi Arabia which technically is still ongoing since 2015. The Saudi air campaign against the Houthis was in a way to make sure that the Iran-backed group did not cement power on the Kingdom’s doorstep, and have influence over the critical Red Sea waterways, which not only feed into the Suez Canal but also play host to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)’s grand ambitions for Saudi economic diversification. Some reports have also highlighted the Houthis aligning with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in another marriage of convenience to push back against what is perceived as external interference in Yemen’s polity and its internationally recognised government based out of Aden. 

The Saudi campaign, which did not include ‘boots on the ground’ remains a quagmire, forcing Riyadh to open diplomacy channels, further aided by Saudi–Iran diplomatic normalisation in 2023 that was brokeredby China. These moves have distanced Saudi from any direct conflicts for the moment, including taking up any unilateral military response in favour of the Palestinian cause even as Israel uses disproportionate military power to attain its aims of ‘ending Hamas’. Even Egypt, an Arab state much more closely involved with Gazan affairs as a neighbouring state, refuses to help Palestinians directly. It fears that engaging in the conflict might entangle it in Israel’s war efforts and cause a potential collapse of the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty, the Camp David Accords, which have been in place since 1978. 

All these intricacies of regional geopolitics have given space to Houthis to take on Israel much more directly, in a way most Arab states are refusing to do. This position has pushed the Houthis from a localised militia to an outfit that at least behaves more like an official military unit on the surface. It now has a big presence on social media and even some support within the Arab populations. While the group benefits from its patronage provided by Iran, which has clearly increased many folds since October 2023, Tehran also benefits from the deniability it can claim.

“The resistance (Houthis) has its own tools…and acts in accordance with its own decisions and capabilities,” Ali Bagheri, then Iran’s deputy foreign minister and currently the acting foreign minister, had said in December. These tactical capabilities being highlighted have since been deployed by the Houthis in the Red Sea, so much so, that even the Indian Navy had to station itself in the region to protect Indian interests in global trade, supply chains, and energy security. Even politically, the Houthis have tried to build depth with states like Iraq where a tussle between Iran-backed and US-backed influence is almost a permanent fixture, giving their kind some space to manoeuvre. 

Presence in the Red Sea

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) recently announced that its assets in the region had destroyed three Iran-backed Houthi “uncrewed surface vessels” in the Red Sea. This meant either sophisticated or makeshift sea-borne drones were being deployed by the group to target both US military assets and commercial vessels that are involved in trade with Israel. Small manned gunboats operating in certain numbers is a strategy previously employed by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

Before these, the Houthis have also operationalised ballistic missiles to attack targets in the Red Sea. On June 20, the Houthis sank a second ship, raising alarm by commercial shippers. The missiles in question are in all likeliness supplied by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and particularly its external wing, the Quds Force over the past few years. According to scholar Fabian Hinz, the missiles in question include Iranian designs and older Soviet and Chinese ones that may have been re-adapted for easier use by the Houthi’s limited technical know-how. 

There, however, remains a clear distinction on how some of these groups are being honed as part of the resistance. The Houthis capacities are being strengthened largely by way of prioritising sea-based warfare. On another front, thousands of miles from Gaza, the Ukrainians are using unmanned boats, or ‘naval drones’, to counter Russia in the Black Sea. While Iranian money and know-how are fuelling the Houthis basic technological capacities in the Red Sea, American and European aid is similarly bolstering Ukraine’s. Although politics and geopolitics differ, tactics and operational thinking are on a similar wavelength. Both are led by low-cost automation of weapons with an aim to minimise human losses and protect high-cost weapon systems such as combat jets, naval ships, and missiles, amongst others. 

Along with politics and tactical military strategies, the Houthi’s design also upends the ‘cost of war’ debate. In January, the French Navy’s commander for the Indian Ocean, Vice Admiral Emmanuel Slaars had to publicly defend his frigate’s use of Aster 15 missiles, with each costing upwards of US$1 million, to take down Houthi drones which may have cost only a few thousand dollars to build. Similar costs have been subsumed by other navies such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). However, for the likes of India, for example, such capacity deployment is unpalatable. Not to mention, an Indian vessel using just a few missiles to repel a drone attack, would have to head back to port in India to re-stock its ammunitions. This ironic weaponisation of the ‘cost of war’ itself plays well into the hands of some militias. 

Conclusion

The Houthis are prioritising supporting Gaza and Hamas at a time when few Arab states in the region are. The decision to do so could go a long way in cementing the group as a more formalised and formidable political force in the region. The war in Gaza and the decision to be a part of Iran’s axis has benefitted the Houthis tremendously, who have gone from sharing a single Kalashnikov between fighters to a more trained, funded, armed, and experienced fighting force. Even if Gaza gains minimally from their patronage, and the group’s direct targeting of Israel remains a long shot, ‘Ansarallah’ has successfully used the war to force multiply its own placement as an ideology with a military. 

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• About the author: Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation.