Erosion Of The Norm Of Using Chemical Weapons – Analysis

By Rani Chor

(FPRI) — The global norm against chemical weapons, bolstered by international disarmament initiatives and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), stands as a pillar of modern arms control. This treaty has achieved remarkable successes, including the elimination of 97 percent of the world’s declared chemical weapons stockpiles. Yet, this progress masks an unsettling reality: There are high-profile violations by states like Russia, Syria, and North Korea and mounting efforts by terrorist organizations and insurgents to acquire chemical weapons, which reveal challenges to their complete elimination and the norm against their use.

Unlike nuclear weapons, chemical agents are relatively accessible to produce and deploy, making them an attractive option for actors willing to defy international law. These breaches not only threaten global security but also undermine the stability of the liberal international order. Addressing these challenges demands renewed focus on the CWC’s limitations, the persistence of noncompliance, and the broader implications of an eroding taboo against chemical warfare.

The global ban on chemical weapons—once a universal red line—is eroding fast. To halt this dangerous slide, the United States and its allies must bolster enforcement under the CWC and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), preserving the norm against these inhumane weapons.

The Norm Against Chemical Weapons: Are They Contested?

The CWC is the primary tool to prevent the spread of chemical weapons to states and non-state actors, and the agreement paved the way for the destruction of the vast majority of chemical weapons on this planet. The OPCW plays a crucial role in monitoring compliance and overseeing the destruction of chemical stockpiles. At the same time, multilateral export control regimes, like the Australia Group, aim to restrict the materials and technology necessary for chemical weapon production.

A key drawback of the CWC is its uneven enforcement. While some states have complied with the treaty’s stringent requirements, others have been reluctant to declare their stockpiles or destroy their chemical arsenals. Compliance is often seen as overly burdensome and helps explain why signatory states have violated the spirit of the agreement and why non-signatories may now be willing to use these weapons.

The CWC clearly defines the prohibition against chemical weapons use, possession, and proliferation. Yet, unlike the norms surrounding nuclear weapons—on use, proliferation, and testing—chemical weapons norms seem less ingrained in international security frameworks. This may be due, in part, to the historical perception of chemical weapons as “second-tier” threats compared to nuclear arms, making them more susceptible to violations by state actors.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925, an earlier treaty, prohibited the use of chemical and biological weapons in war but did not extend to their possession. Consequently, during the Cold War, chemical weapons continued to be developed and stockpiled, particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union. The CWC was later established as a more comprehensive non-proliferation and disarmament treaty when chemical weapons no longer held high utility amongst major powers, as they were redundant to the nuclear question. While necessitating the destruction of chemical arsenals, CWC enforcement has not always been consistent, with violators facing varying levels of international response. For instance, chemical weapon use in the Syrian civil war, while condemned globally, has been met with inconsistent enforcement, and geopolitical dynamics often complicate intervention efforts.

The once-robust global norm against chemical weapons is under threat as nations increasingly flout regulations enshrined in the CWC. To address this erosion, it is critical to examine three case studies—Syria’s use of chemical weapons to maintain power amid civil war and North Korea’s and Russia’s deployment of these weapons as tools of assassination—each illustrating distinct motivations behind this dangerous trend.

Case Study 1: Russia’s Novichok Agents

The most serious example of the erosion of chemical weapons norms can be seen in Russia’s use of Novichok agents to assassinate dissidents. Although Russia is a signatory to the CWC, it has exploited loopholes in the treaties to develop Novichok, a nerve agent that was not declared to the OPCW. This may have been on purpose. Due to uncertainty surrounding their chemical structures, the chemical precursors used to make Novichok were excluded from control regimes. This has allowed Russia to continue producing and stockpiling them, which violates the spirit of the treaty, even if Russia has exploited a well-known loophole. The danger is that now, Russia has used the weapon to undermine the norm Moscow had helped to create against its use.

The most notable use of Novichok occurred in 2018 when Sergei Skripal, a former Russian spy, and his daughter were poisoned in the United Kingdom. The attack also affected British police officer Nick Bailey and a couple who mistakenly handled the substance. Despite Russia’s denial of responsibility, the UK government attributed the attack to Novichok, which it claimed was stockpiled by Russia. Although Russia had destroyed nearly 40,000 metric tons of its declared chemical weapons stockpile by 2017, the attack demonstrated its continued use of chemical weapons, signaling the erosion of norms that were once strongly upheld.

Case Study 2: North Korea and VX Nerve Agent

In 2017, assassins violated chemical weapons norms by killing Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, with a VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur airport. The public assassination, sanctioned by the North Korean regime, showcased North Korea’s blatant disregard for international norms against chemical weapons use.

Despite global condemnation, North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program remains a significant threat to international security. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert highlighted that “this public display of contempt for universal norms against chemical weapons use further demonstrates the reckless nature of North Korea.” The assassination sent a clear message that North Korea is willing to challenge international norms with impunity, further weakening the global stance against chemical weapons.

Case Study 3: Syria’s Use of Chemical Weapons in Civil War

The Assad regime relied on chemical weapons to deter war with Israel. Hafez al-Assad, former President Bashar al-Assad’s father, started the program tracing back to the 1970s, when Syria sought assistance from the Soviet Union to develop nuclear energy capabilities for ostensibly peaceful purposes. After his death, his son used these weapons to stave off collapse early on in the country’s civil war. He eventually reached an agreement with the United States and Russia to destroy them after a large-scale Sarin attack in 2013 prompted US debate about striking the regime. Assad relented and destroyed large numbers of his chemical precursors but held some weapons back and used them in small-scale ways to retain power. Despite Syria’s commitment to disarm in 2013, the OPCW’s Investigation and Identification Team attributedthree chemical attacks in 2020 directly to Assad’s forces. These attacks have been largely ineffective in achieving military objectives but have caused significant civilian casualties, further eroding the norm against chemical weapons used in warfare.

Assad was ultimately ousted from power in December 2024, and the remnants of his stockpile are now scattered throughout a war-ravaged country. The history of the conflict underscores challenges in enforcing chemical weapons norms in regions plagued by civil strife and geopolitical entanglements. While the international community has condemned these attacks, efforts to hold the Assad regime accountable have been limited, raising questions about the effectiveness of the CWC in preventing such violations.

The Future of Chemical Weapons Norms

Despite significant progress in non-proliferation, including the 2023 destruction of the last chemical weapon in the US stockpile, the persistence of chemical arsenals in states like Syria, Russia, and North Korea reveals enduring challenges. These challenges are twofold: ensuring the complete elimination of chemical weapons and preventing their proliferation. The relative ease with which these weapons can be produced and deployed underscores their threat, particularly in volatile regions where authoritarian regimes routinely disregard international norms.

Syria, for instance, retained chemical weapons initially intended as a deterrent against Israel, only to turn them inward during its civil war—a chilling reflection of their use to sustain regime stability. Russia and North Korea have similarly flouted the CWC, deploying these weapons in recent, albeit poorly executed, assassination attempts. These cases highlight the fragility of international agreements and the audacity of states willing to exploit loopholes and evade accountability.

The global norm against chemical weapons—a tier of destruction so abhorrent that nations once universally agreed to regulate them—is at risk of further erosion. The issue merits importance not only because of the sheer brutality of these weapons but also because their use signals a dangerous precedent: a return to an era where such atrocities were committed with impunity.

To prevent this dark regression, the United States and its allies should work to strengthen enforcement mechanisms under the CWC and the OPCW. The international community’s collective response will shape the future of chemical weapons norms, influencing both state behavior and the threat posed by non-state actors. Without renewed commitment and cooperation, the world risks undermining decades of progress, allowing chemical weapons to once again wreak devastation on civilians and combatants alike.

• About the author: Rani Chor is a student at Stanford University, pursuing a B.A. in International Relations with minors in Biology and Human Rights.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI