US Deterrence Strategy: Ukraine’s Nuclear Plants – OpEd

As the US  tries to broker a peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia, an unexpected idea has emerged in the talks: potential US control of a key Ukrainian nuclear power plant on the front line of the war with Russia (The Washington Post).

President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky discussed “American ownership” of nuclear power plants in Ukraine in a phone call. However, Zelensky later said that only Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant had been discussed, which is occupied by Russian forces. Alex Riabchyn, a former deputy minister for energy in Ukraine, emphasized that the future of the Zaporizhzhia plant is a key issue in peace negotiations. “This is super important, not only for Ukraine but for the EU as We used to sell a lot of electricity to the EU, helping them to function and decarbonize.” 

Russian forces captured the plant early during the invasion. Although the plant is no longer generating electricity, the UN’s nuclear watchdog maintains monitors at the site, as it does at all Ukrainian nuclear facilities. Ukraine continues to demand the plant’s return to its jurisdiction and rejects Russia’s claim over its territory. Russia’s Foreign Ministry announced on March 25 that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is a Russian facility and cannot be transferred to Ukraine or any other country. 

The idea that the US might assume control, if not ownership, of nuclear power plants in a country at war might seem far-fetched. But the US has been actively involved in assisting Ukraine with nuclear safety through the Department of Energy (DOE) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Trump has shown keen interest in Ukraine’s industrial assets. Trump is pushing for a “trillion-dollar deal” for US access to Ukraine’s critical minerals.

Why US Nuclear Experts?

• Safety and Security – The US experts might be there to ensure the security of nuclear materials, monitor for potential radiation leaks or sabotage and provide technical support for Ukrainian nuclear facilities.
• Preventing Nuclear Proliferation – With the ongoing war, there are concerns about nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. US experts might be assisting in safeguarding radioactive materials and preventing their potential use in dirty bombs.
• Intelligence and Strategic Interests – Some US personnel could be gathering intelligence on Russian activity around nuclear sites, given the strategic importance of Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure.
• Support for Energy Independence – Ukraine relies heavily on nuclear power, with over 50% of its electricity coming from NPPs. The US has an interest in ensuring Ukraine’s energy grid remains functional, especially with Russian attacks targeting infrastructure.

Who Benefits?

• Ukraine – Gains technical expertise, safety assurance, and potentially financial or material support for nuclear energy stability.
• US and NATO – Ensures nuclear security, prevents a disaster that could impact Europe, and monitors Russian actions near sensitive sites.
• Russia (Indirectly) – Could use the presence of US nuclear staff as propaganda to claim US meddling in Ukraine’s nuclear affairs. But Putin is not likely to reach this stage.

Logic of Deterrence

The proposition that US controlof Ukraine’s nuclear plants could provide indirect security is rooted in the logic of deterrence — basically, if American personnel are deployed in the nuclear plants, Russia would be less likely to strike them, knowing it could escalate into a direct confrontation with the US, similar to how US troops in allied countries serve as a deterrent. In the physical presence or supervisory role of a major nuclear power like the US would increase the risk of direct confrontation with Russia in the event of an attack or sabotage on these critical sites.

However, Putin is not likely to allow formal American presence at this stage. For Russia, the presence of US or NATO personnel in Ukraine, especially near sensitive infrastructure, is seen as a massive provocation and a red line. Putin’s narrative has always framed the war as a defensive move against NATO encroachment, so American involvement in nuclear infrastructure would be fuel for that narrative. Zaporizhzhia being the most important one is currently under Russian occupation and is already a flashpoint. 

Such an arrangement would not only symbolize extended US commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity but would also create a “tripwire” effect—where harm to the facilities, and by extension to US interests or personnel, would trigger broader geopolitical consequences. This strategic signaling could dissuade Moscow from targeting Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure, knowing it would no longer be a purely regional matter but one involving US national security concerns. However, this strategy carries inherent risks. It may escalate tensions, as Russia could interpret US involvement as a violation of regional balances or an attempt to assert de facto control over Ukraine’s sovereignty. Moreover, it would blur the line between defensive oversight and provocative intervention, potentially increasing the likelihood of miscalculation or accidental escalation.

US and or IAEA supervisory umbrella mechanisms over Ukraine’s nuclear power infrastructure aligns with established doctrines of extended deterrence and tripwire defense posturing. By embedding US personnel, technical monitors, or policy oversight frameworks within Ukraine’s nuclear sites, US would effectively internationalize the security perimeter surrounding these critical assets, thereby elevating the strategic costs of hostile actions against them.

This posture of Deterrence will signal a clear message to Russia and other regional actors that the security of Ukraine’s nuclear infrastructure is no longer a purely sovereign matter but a component of broader US geopolitical interests. US control would complicate Russian strategic calculus, introducing uncertainty about American thresholds for retaliation and reducing Russia’s freedom of action.

US control of Ukraine’s nuclear plants may enhance deterrence and provide indirect security, it would also inject a new layer of complexity into an already volatile geopolitical environment. However, in terms of potential future scenarios or policy proposals, there could be a possibility of International (not just US) oversight — like under the IAEA umbrella, with European or neutral third-party monitors, which may be more acceptable to Russia than direct US presence. In view of the ongoing peace talks President Trump is not likely to; reminds me of the proverb or a metaphorical saying:” Avoid putting your hand in the honeycomb if you’re not ready to get stung Or He who looks for honey, must have the courage to face the bees”. Which can be an excuse for President Putin to walk out of the talks and at this stage President Trump will avoid “Stirring up a Hornet’s nest” till final peace prevails.