The Horn Of Africa’s Reset: Eritrea-Ethiopia Rift Threatens Wider Instability – Analysis

By Samir Bhattacharya

The fear of another regional war seems to be looming over the Horn of Africa, backed by a surreal sense of déjà vu in how things unfold. Back in November 2020, a war broke out between the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF) and a coalition of rebel groups led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). This war continued for nearly two years, taking the lives of 600,000 people and leaving another 900,000 Ethiopians displaced. A peace deal of an indefinite humanitarian truce was worked out in March 2022, only to see the fighting break out by September. In November 2022, another peace agreement was signed that lasted for a little over two years.

In the last war, the Ethiopian Government forces fought the strong and well-armed TPLF and its allies, including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Eritrea sided with the government at that time and helped contain the TPLF. However, this time, Eritrea seems to have switched sides and is reportedly supporting different rebel groups against the ENDF.

The change in Eritrea’s position is not entirely unexpected. To lay out some historical context, Eritrea, the former Italian colony, was annexed by Ethiopia in 1962. After a three-decade war against Ethiopia, the country gained independence in 1993, leaving Ethiopia landlocked. After coming to power in 2018, the Ethiopian Prime Minister (PM) Abiy Ahmed Ali normalised the diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

As a result of improved relations, Eritrea supported the Abiy-led Ethiopian government, amid its brewing war against the TPLF. Nonetheless, Abiy decided to end the war in November 2023 through a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, known as the ‘Pretoria Agreement’, without consulting Eritrea. This irked Eritrea, and their frustration was palpable in the way the Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki described the agreement—‘Tekolifna’ (we have been frustrated). Although the Pretoria agreement provided for the ‘withdrawal of foreign forces’, Eritrea was not a signatory and maintained some troops inside Ethiopia.

Meanwhile, another coalition of militias known as Fano—an ethno-nationalist group claiming to represent Amhara (Ethiopia’s second largest ethnicity that fought alongside the national army against the TPLF)—has been fighting against the national force since April 2023. The name ‘Fano’ loosely translates as freedom fighter, and dates back to the successful campaign by a volunteer army against the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia in the 1930s.

Fano took arms against the national government because they felt excluded from the Pretoria agreement. An important clause of the Pretoria agreement disbanded all regional forces such as the TPLF, Fano, and OLA. Fano viewed this demand as a threat to their survival, against potential onslaught from the rival regions of Tigray and Oromia.

Furthermore, in January 2024, PM Abiy Ahmed announced his intention to acquire a Red Sea port by signing a controversial agreement with Somaliland—a breakaway region of Somalia. Eritrea signed a security agreement with Egypt and Somalia to counter Ethiopia’s potential irredentist move. The subsequent deployment of Ethiopian troops at the Eritrea border and Eritrea’s nationwide military mobilisation in response have put the Horn of Africa on edge, with the possibility of a looming war.

While the Pretoria agreement ended Tigray’s conflict with the national forces, it also divided Tigray into two factions—TPLF and Tigray Interim Administration (TIA). After the peace deal, an inclusive interim administration was formed with the mandate to work with the Ethiopian government to resolve their disputes diplomatically. Fearing their loss of power and accusing the interim government of working against the interest of Tigray, one of the factions from the TPLF led by Debretsion Gebremichael, the current chairman of the TPLF, rebelled against the interim government and toppled the federally appointed interim President Getachew Reda. The possibility of this faction colluding with Eritrea to fight against the central government remains high, especially now. In any case, as Ethiopia and Eritrea seem to be supporting the rival factions, another proxy war may well have started in Tigray.

This Ethiopian Groundhog Day,  a Tigray-led rebellion appearing once every few years, requires a longer-term solution. Article 39 of Ethiopia’s Constitution gives every region the right to secession, and allows the regional private army to operate in tandem with the national army. This regional devolution of power is a big challenge for Ethiopia’s statehood.

The path to peace in the Horn of Africa should also involve the countries of the Middle East. Both Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have significant investments in the region and would be reluctant to let the region descend into chaos. Egypt is another important country in the area. While a weakened Ethiopia would be advantageous for Egypt, especially in the backdrop of their ongoing discord over the sharing of the Nile’s water and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), if the conflict blows out of proportion, the crisis could certainly hurt Egypt. Besides, a chaotic Red Sea channel would not be conducive to trade through the Suez Canal, Egypt’s economic lifeline.

Last time, Ethiopia managed to contain TPLF using drones made in Türkiye and China. However, this time, the rebel groups, particularly Fano, are also equipped with heavy artillery and modern weapon systems. If these external actors decide to support different rebel groups to maintain their vested interests, the result would be a never-ending civil war.

It’s Groundhog Day in Ethiopia. However, this time, the stakes are higher with broader regional implications. If clashes erupt again between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the fallout would be far-reaching in an already volatile region. It could destroy what remains of Sudan, destabilise Chad, and create a corridor of instability connecting the Sahel to the Red Sea. The entire region hangs in a precarious balance, and it is in the international community’s interest to prevent another war in the Horn of Africa before it begins.

• About the author: Samir Bhattacharya is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation.