Uganda: Current Issues And US Relations – Analysis
By CRS
By Lauren Ploch Blanchard
Uganda, led by one of the world’s longest-serving heads of state, President Yoweri Museveni, has been viewed by successive U.S. Administrations as an important counterterrorism and global health partner in Africa.1 The country has been a leading troop contributor to the African Union (AU) stabilization mission in Somalia, where it has supported efforts to counter Al Shabaab—Al Qaeda’s largest and wealthiest affiliate—for almost two decades. The Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) is also deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where it conducts operations against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a group of Ugandan origin aligned with the Islamic State, and other local armed groups.2 UPDF forays in neighboring countries have been controversial, and Uganda (Figure 1) has been implicated in the illicit trade of gold and other natural resources during its operations in DRC and South Sudan. Uganda hosts one of the world’s largest refugee populations: over 1.8 million people, most of them from South Sudan and DRC.
Uganda has never had a democratic transition of power. It has one of the world’s youngest and fastest growing populations, and the vast majority of Ugandans have known only one leader. Under President Museveni, who was described by U.S. officials in the 1990s as one of a “visionary” new generation of African leaders, the country’s political system has grown increasingly authoritarian, despite regular elections.3 Corruption, high unemployment, rising crime, human rights abuses, land disputes, ethnic favoritism, and uneven development have fueled popular discontent. Freedom House ranks Uganda “Not Free” in its annual Freedom in the World index, and observers warn of growing risks to the country’s stability.4
U.S. engagement in Uganda over the past quarter century has focused broadly on advancing regional stability and countering terrorism, responding to global health threats and humanitarian crises, and promoting democracy and development. Over the past decade, U.S. officials and some Members of Congress raised growing concern with human rights violations, closing political space, and corruption.5 Ugandan security forces have been implicated in serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and the arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance of hundreds of government critics and opposition supporters.6 Alongside these issues, the Biden Administration condemned Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act, adopted in 2023, as “one of the most extreme anti-LGBTQ+ laws in the world.”7Citing human rights concerns, the Biden Administration terminated Uganda’s eligibility for trade benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in late 2023 and issued an advisory warning U.S. businesses and investors of financial and reputational risks related to “endemic corruption and the lack of respect for human rights in Uganda.”8 Museveni has rebuffed governance and human rights critiques, accused Western countries of trying to “impose” homosexuality on other countries, and cultivated closer relations with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC; China).9
The Trump Administration has yet to articulate its policy toward Uganda, but its changes to U.S. foreign assistance have had a substantial impact on U.S. engagement in the country in early 2025. Uganda has been among the top African recipients of U.S. foreign aid for more than a decade, receiving over half a billion dollars a year in U.S. support. The United States has been Uganda’s largest aid donor, with a majority of U.S. funding focused on global health efforts. Communicable diseases, notably malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and respiratory and diarrheal diseases, are among the leading causes of death in Uganda, which has faced multiple Ebola and Marburg outbreaks, and strengthening the country’s health system has been a long-standing U.S. objective. Uganda is facing its eighth Ebola outbreak since 2000, and reports suggest that U.S. support for the response has been affected by the Administration’s aid freeze and subsequent contract terminations, as have U.S.-funded HIV, TB, and malaria programs.10 The latest U.S. Integrated Country Strategy for Uganda (released in 2022) asserted that hundreds of thousands of Ugandans could die without U.S. health assistance and disease threats could endanger the United States. The strategy, which highlighted Uganda’s untapped reserves of base metals and rare earth minerals, noted that health programs were the “the most popular element of the bilateral relationship.”11
Background and Political Situation
Uganda has a turbulent history—after gaining independence from British rule in 1962, its first president, Edward Mutesa II, king of the Buganda kingdom (from which Uganda’s name derives), was violently ousted in 1966 by prime minister Milton Obote, who was in turn overthrown by his military chief, Idi Amin, in a 1971 coup. Amin’s rule was brutal and repressive, and human rights groups estimate that 100,000-500,000 people were killed under his reign before he was ousted by Tanzanian troops and Ugandan insurgents in 1979.12 A period of political instability and civil war followed, and Obote returned to power for several years before he was ousted in another coup.
President Museveni, who seized power in 1986 after waging a rebellion following his loss in the 1980 elections, has led Uganda for almost four decades. “The problem of Africa in general and Uganda in particular is not the people but leaders who want to stay in power,” he said in his 1986 inaugural address.13 Now 80, Museveni appears set to run for a seventh term in January 2026.
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), formed from his rebel group, dominates the parliament, in which the UPDF, a key constituency of his, holds seats. The body amended the constitution to remove presidential term limits in 2005 and the age limit for the presidency in 2017, allowing Museveni to run again. The age limit debate spurred protests and a heavy police crackdown. Opinion polls have suggested most Ugandans support age and term limits.14
Museveni won 58% of the vote in the 2021 elections, per official results, amid an internet blackout, intimidation and violence by security forces, and allegations of fraud.15 Opposition candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, a musician better known as Bobi Wine who was elected to parliament in 2017, came in second, with 34%. The 2021 result was Museveni’s lowest official margin of victory since taking power. The State Department called the process “fundamentally flawed” and voiced concern over the shooting of protesters, the arrest of opposition presidential candidates, and violence against journalists, human rights activists, and opposition supporters during the election period.16 Wine’s National Unity Platform (NUP) party won the largest number of opposition seats (17%) in the National Assembly. The NRM retained its parliamentary majority, but the vice president and over a dozen ministers lost their seats.
Bobi Wine, whose campaign was chronicled in an Oscar-nominated documentary produced by National Geographic, brought new energy to Uganda’s political opposition.17 Unlike veteran opposition leader Kizza Besigye, 68, who served alongside Museveni in the guerilla war before running against him in four elections, Wine, now 43, is part of the post-war generation. His “People Power” movement aims to harness mounting frustration among a youthful electorate. With almost 80% of Uganda’s population under the age of 30, Wine has sought to challenge the NRM’s claim to legitimacy based on a liberation struggle that ended before most Ugandans were born. Elected in 2017 to represent an urban constituency in Kampala, Wine has also sought to engage the urban poor, in one of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world.18
Wine was a vocal opponent of lifting the presidential age limit, and he made international headlines in 2018 when security forces detained and severely beat him while he was campaigning for a parliamentary colleague.19 An elite security unit shot and killed his driver, and Wine and five other MPs were arrested, along with over 30 opposition supporters, accused of inciting violence against a presidential motorcade, and charged with treason. Wine, who was reportedly tortured in detention, received medical treatment in the United States after being released on bail. The incident spurred protests and a severe crackdown by security forces. The government brought additional charges against Wine in 2019, accusing him of intent to “alarm, annoy, or ridicule” the president; he was arrested again in 2020 and charged with “acts likely to spread” COVID-19 during his presidential campaign.20 His 2018 treason charge remains pending.
In late 2024, Ugandan security officials forcibly returned Museveni’s longtime rival Kizza Besigye from Kenya and presented him in a Uganda military court, where he was charged with treason and plotting to overthrow the government. Besigye denies the charges, which carry the death penalty. Uganda’s Supreme Court stopped his trial in January, ruling that civilians cannot be tried in military tribunals and ordered the cases of Besigye and others transferred to civilian courts. Besigye’s abduction followed the July 2024 abduction of 36 members of his party, the Forum for Democratic Change, from Kenya to Uganda, where they stand charged with terrorism.
Human Rights Concerns
The State Department’s most recent human rights report documented serious restrictions of political rights, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture by state agencies in Uganda.21 Security forces “often” arbitrarily arrest and detain people, particularly opposition supporters, activists, demonstrators, journalists, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons, per the report. Human rights groups estimate over 1,000 people were detained around the 2021 elections, and abductions of opposition supporters reportedly continue.22 The arrest of Besigye and others in his party, reported NUP abductions, and violence during a March 2025 by-election against journalists underscore concerns about the climate for the 2026 polls.23
Civil society in Uganda has faced increasing pressure and intimidation. Ugandan authorities suspended 54 civil society groups after the 2021 elections, accusing them of foreign-sponsored interference in Uganda’s politics. The government forced the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to close its office in Uganda in 2023.
Torture in Uganda is a critical issue, according to human rights reports. Human Rights Watch, among others, has reported on the unlawful detention and torture of hundreds of people since at least 2018.24 The State Department report described impunity for torture as “rampant.” A group of Ugandan activists, opposition leaders, and government critics filed testimonies in 2023 with the International Criminal Court (ICC), accusing senior Ugandan officials, including Museveni and his son, UPDF chief General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, of torture, killings, and other crimes against humanity, citing abuses around the 2021 elections and other incidents. Among those who filed submissions with the ICC is satirist Kakwenza Rukirabashaija, who was detained and reportedly tortured after criticizing members of the first family, including Kainerugaba, in 2021.25
The Biden Administration sanctioned several Ugandan security officials for their role in torture and repression, including the head of military intelligence in 2021 and the head of Uganda’s prisons service in 2023. In 2024, the Biden Administration imposed visa bans on Uganda’s deputy military chief for his role in extrajudicial killings and on several Ugandan Police Force officials for torture and related abuses.26 The first Trump Administration sanctioned a former head of the Ugandan Police Force for serious human rights abuses and corruption in 2019.
Threats to LGBT persons in Uganda have drawn international attention. A law adopted in 2014 made same-sex relations (already illegal in Uganda) punishable by life in prison before it was struck down in court. The parliament passed legislation in 2023 that went further, not only making “the offense of homosexuality” punishable by life in prison, but creating a new offence of “aggravated homosexuality” punishable by death, and making the “promotion of homosexuality” punishable by up to 20 years in prison. The Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA) criminalized failing to report someone suspected of participating in same-sex acts to police as well as renting property to LGBT persons. In the law’s first year, an estimated 600 people were subjected to human rights violations and abuse based on their actual or imputed sexual orientation, per the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, who urged its repeal.27 U.S. and UN officials raised alarm that the AHA would lead to reduced access to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment services; reports indicate that fear has since discouraged some LGBT Ugandans from seeking health services.28
In response to the AHA, which the Biden Administration described as “part of an ongoing trend of democratic erosion in Uganda,” the U.S. government issued visa restrictions and travel and business advisories, and redirected aid that had been provided through Uganda’s government, including HIV/AIDS and other health assistance, to nongovernmental implementing partners.29 The Biden Administration revoked Uganda’s AGOA eligibility on the basis of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights by the Ugandan government, setting the AHA’s repeal as one of the human rights-related requirements for reinstating eligibility.30 In 2024, Uganda’s Constitutional Court overturned sections of the law restricting health care access and criminalizing renting property to LGBT persons but otherwise upheld the AHA.
The Economy: Oil, Gold, and Corruption Concerns
President Museveni has outlined a vision of transforming Uganda, with an economy long dominated by rain-fed agriculture, into an upper-middle-income country by 2040.37 His government has focused heavily on infrastructure investments, which have improved road networks and increased power generation, but also fueled debt. Uganda owes most of its debt to traditional multilateral lenders, but China’s debt share is rising. The International Monetary Fund assesses that Uganda has a moderate risk of debt distress and limited space to absorb shocks.38
Uganda’s economic outlook is tied to its nascent energy sector: the IMF predicts its economy will grow over 7% in 2025 and possibly over 12% in 2026, depending on when oil production begins. With an estimated 1.4 billion barrels of recoverable oil reserves, the country expects to ultimately produce 230,000 barrels per day, roughly on par with Gabon. France’s TotalEnergies and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have licenses to develop the reserves; drilling at fields around Lake Albert began in 2023. A U.S. company, McDermott, is part of an international consortium developing fields for Total. Construction of the 895-mile East African Crude Oil Pipeline, which would carry the oil to a Tanzanian port for export, has been plagued by delays and financing challenges. The $4 billion pipeline, which has drawn environmental, climate, and forced displacement concerns, is part of a broader $10 billion project to develop Uganda’s oil.39
Gold. Uganda has largely untapped reserves of base metals, cobalt, coltan, and rare earth minerals, and in 2022, officials announced the discovery of large gold deposits.40 Uganda licensed a Chinese firm to produce and refine the gold; production is reportedly set to commence in 2025.41 The $200 million project represents the country’s first major large-scale production of gold, which was previously limited to artisanal and small-scale miners. Uganda has nevertheless been a significant gold exporter for years: gold surpassed coffee as its biggest foreign currency earner in 2018, with the value of annual gold exports rising from $10 million a decade prior to over $500 million that year. Uganda’s gold exports more than doubled in 2019, to over $1.2 billion, and surged in 2023 to $2.3 billion as new processors came online.42
Only a fraction of Uganda’s gold exports are mined in Uganda—the country is widely reported to be a hub for gold smuggled from other countries in the region.43In 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department reported that over 90% of DRC’s gold “is smuggled to regional states, including Uganda and Rwanda” and sanctioned the Africa Gold Refinery (AGR; then Uganda’s only gold refinery), its Belgian owner, and a network of companies involved in the illicit movement of gold valued at hundreds of millions of dollars from DRC.44 AGR had previously drawn controversy in 2019, when it reportedly processed over $300 million in gold brought from Venezuela on a Russian charter aircraft—an apparent effort to circumvent U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s central bank and gold industry.45 Reports also suggest that gold mined in South Sudan and Sudan has been smuggled into Uganda for processing and export.46 In 2024, the State Department issued a Statement of Concern on the illicit trade of certain minerals, including gold and tantalum, from DRC through Uganda and Rwanda, which “in many cases” helped finance DRC armed groups.47
Corruption Allegations. Corruption and patronage are reportedly entrenched and seen by some observers as worsening.48 The State Department’s annual human rights report has routinely noted “numerous” reports of government corruption and asserted that “officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”49 Uganda’s Inspector General has reported that much of Uganda’s revenue is lost to corruption, estimating the annual cost of corruption at $2.4 billion (roughly a quarter of the nation’s budget) and assessing that 85% of government jobs at the district level are secured through bribery.50 Some of Uganda’s corruption scandals have drawn international attention and legal action, including the reported bribery of then-foreign minister Sam Kutesa by a Hong Kong politician on behalf of a PRC-based energy company in 2016.51
Embezzlement scandals involving the diversion of donor funds have led to several suspensions of donor assistance. Some donors froze aid in 2018 in response to a scandal involving inflated refugee rolls and diverted food aid, which implicated both Ugandan officials and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR); the United States, as UNHCR’s largest donor, demanded accountability from Uganda and UNHCR.52 Several Ugandan civil servants were later prosecuted, but no higher-level officials, despite reports implicating individuals in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). OPM staff have reportedly been involved in subsequent scandals, including related to COVID-19 aid and refugee resettlement.53 In 2023, UN agencies reported another case of inflated refugee figures, again involving OPM staff, resulting in prosecutions.54 Some observers allege that Uganda’s role as Africa’s largest refugee host and permissive refugee policy have constrained the ability of UNHCR and others in the international community to push for greater accountability.55
As noted above, the Biden Administration issued a business advisory in late 2023 warning U.S. businesses and investors of risks resulting from endemic corruption and violence against human rights activists, media members, political opponents, LGBT persons, and other groups. The advisory cited risks “associated with interference in and intimidation of the judiciary, use of influence in the courts to resolve political disputes, and co-opted security forces,” as well as rent-seeking from officials and intrusive government security and surveillance.56 In 2024, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on four current and former Ugandan officials, including Speaker of parliament Anita Among, for their reported involvement in significant corruption.57
Regional Issues
Uganda has complicated relationships with some of its neighbors. It has intervened militarily in DRC and South Sudan, and its forces have been accused of human rights abuses and trafficking natural resources, including gold, timber, and ivory, from those countries.58 Museveni has supported several insurgencies in the region, including those that brought the ruling regimes in Rwanda and South Sudan to power.59 Uganda’s relationship with Rwanda is particularly complex; the countries appear to be competing for influence in eastern DRC, where both have economic, security, and political interests.60 UN sanctions monitors for DRC have implicated both Rwanda and Uganda in providing support and training to the M23 rebel group in DRC, which is currently engaged in a territorial offensive that experts warn could spark another regional war.61 In 2024, UN sanctions monitors for Sudan named Uganda as one of the countries through which weapons for the insurgent Rapid Support Forces in Sudan have reportedly been transferred from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is the primary destination for Uganda’s gold exports.62
DRC. Uganda was one of several countries involved in wars in DRC between 1996 and 2003.63 The International Court of Justice ordered Uganda to pay $325 million in reparations to the DRC in 2022, finding it responsible for violating DRC’s borders, the deaths of up to 15,000 people, displacement, rape, child soldier recruitment, and the looting of natural resources. The UPDF deployed into DRC again in the late 2000s, with Congolese permission, in pursuit of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a brutal armed group of Ugandan origin. The United States provided security assistance in support of Ugandan-led regional counter-LRA operations (2008-2017).
In 2021, Uganda deployed several thousand troops into eastern DRC for joint operations with DRC forces against the ADF, aka the Islamic State-DRC. Those operations are ongoing, although UN sanctions monitors and some regional analysts have questioned their effectiveness and Uganda’s motives.64 Uganda began another DRC deployment in early 2023, sending troops to join a Kenyan-led East African Community (EAC) intervention force to stabilize areas affected by the Rwanda-backed M23. While the EAC force deployed in response to a DRC government request, Uganda’s participation spurred some Congolese suspicion, given allegations of Ugandan support to M23, whom Gen. Kainerugaba has repeatedly referred to as “our brothers.”65
The EAC force withdrew in late 2023, but thousands of Ugandan forces remained in DRC for counter-ADF operations. In February 2025, as the M23 expanded northward from its strongholds in DRC’s North Kivu province, Uganda deployed more troops into Ituri province (north of M23-held areas) and subsequently announced that its forces had taken control of the capital of the ADF-affected province and another town reportedly threatened by local militia.66 Some observers posit that Uganda is using its deployments to guarantee continued strategic and economic access in the face of Rwandan expansionism.67 In March 2025, Kainerugaba threatened to help the M23 march on Kisangani, one of DRC’s largest cities.68 Ugandan and Rwandan forces fought over the strategic city 25 years ago, causing immense damage, killing hundreds, and displacing thousands.
South Sudan. Uganda hosts over a million refugees from South Sudan’s civil war. The UPDF deployed when that war began in late 2013, purportedly to ensure state stability and protect key infrastructure at the request of South Sudan’s government. The UPDF guarded the airport, a lifeline for the diplomatic community; Uganda also transferred arms to the government and reportedly conducted airstrikes against the opposition.69 Uganda later withdrew its troops and facilitated the 2018 peace deal. In 2024, UN sanctions monitors documented “significant military activity” by the UPDF, an apparent violation of the UN arms embargo on South Sudan.70 In early 2025, amid fears of a return to full-scale civil war in the country, Uganda deployed additional forces and has conducted airstrikes that by some accounts have killed civilians.71 Kainerugaba publicly acknowledged UPDF airstrikes and declared he was “tired of killing Nuer” (South Sudan’s second largest ethnic group, which comprised the core of the opposition in the civil war), asserting that if the opposition did not surrender, “not even a rat will survive in Nuer country.”72
Somalia. Uganda has been a key troop contributor to the AU mission in Somalia (now known as AUSSOM) since the AU force (then known as AMISOM) first deployed in 2007. In retaliation, Al Shabaab conducted its first attack outside Somalia in Kampala in 2010, killing 79 people, including one American. U.S. officials have called Ugandan forces the AU mission’s “most effective” contingent, but the UPDF has also been implicated in serious abuses against civilians in Somalia.73 The UN Security Council authorized the AU force’s new mandate in late 2024, and while some details of the mission, including its funding, remain unclear, Uganda is expected to be its largest troop contributor, with 4,500 soldiers. Uganda has received support from the United States, European donors, and the United Arab Emirates, among others, for its deployment.
U.S.-Uganda Relations
Successive U.S. presidential administrations have described Uganda as a partner in promoting stability in the region, praised its contribution to countering Al Shabaab in Somalia, lauded its efforts to fight HIV/AIDS, and welcomed its role as a refugee host, while expressing occasional concern about political repression, human rights abuses, and corruption.
Relations became increasingly strained over the past decade amid democratic backsliding in Uganda and its government’s deepening relations with China and Russia (see below). Museveni has routinely spoken of “Western neo-imperialism” and a need to prevent “aggression against Africa,” but some observers see his engagement with U.S. rivals as intended to shield his government from Western criticism.74 The first Trump Administration sanctioned a former Ugandan security official under Executive Order 13818 (“Global Magnitsky”) for torture and four Ugandans, including two judges, for a corrupt adoption scheme. Uganda’s 2021 elections and subsequent developments increased tensions in the U.S.-Uganda relationship. U.S. diplomats in Uganda were reportedly targeted in late 2021 with surveillance equipment acquired by the Ugandan government from an Israeli company, NSO Group, that the U.S. Commerce Department designated for export controls.75 The Biden Administration subsequently designated, as noted above, two Ugandan security officials for Global Magnitsky sanctions and issued travel bans on others. Relations further deteriorated with the 2023 enactment of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Act, which contributed to the Biden Administration’s decisions to issue a business advisory and terminate the country’s eligibility for U.S. trade benefits, among other actions.
Members of Congress from both parties have raised concern over political repression in Uganda.76 Abuses around the 2021 elections led some to call for a review of non-humanitarian aid to ensure that it not abet corruption or human rights abuses.77 The Anti-Homosexuality Act also drew criticism from some Members and prompted the introduction in the 118th Congress of H.Res. 1324, which sought to condemn Uganda’s “undemocratic human rights regression.”78
U.S. Trade. Uganda’s primary exports to the United States are coffee, cocoa, base metals, and fish. Bilateral goods trade totaled $239 million in 2024, and while Uganda lost AGOA eligibility in 2024, U.S. imports rose 14.6% from 2023, totaling $132 million in 2024.79 Per President Trump’s April 2025 tariffs announcement, U.S. imports from Uganda face a new 10% tariff.
U.S. Assistance
The United States allocated bilateral aid for Uganda totaling over $535 million in FY2023 and over $470 million in FY2024.84 The Biden Administration requested almost $532 million for FY2025, of which 88% was intended for health programs. These figures do not reflect all U.S. aid to the country, some of which is provided through regional and global programs. Beyond bilateral assistance, U.S. humanitarian aid allocations for Uganda, which totaled over $75 million in FY2023 and $90 million in FY2024, have supported refugees in the country and food-insecure Ugandans in the drought-prone northeast.85 In addition to routine bilateral assistance for professional military education, the UPDF has received U.S. training, equipment, logistics, and advisory support since 2007 for its deployment in Somalia. Bilateral aid figures do not reflect that funding, which has been provided through State Department budget lines for Somalia, regional and global security initiatives, and Department of Defense (DOD) funding. Prior to Uganda’s flawed 2021 elections, it was a top African recipient of DOD’s global train-and-equip program (now 10 U.S.C. §333), cumulatively receiving well over $300 million in military support between FY2011 and FY2021.
Foreign aid cuts by the Trump Administration, which have prompted congressional debate and legal challenges, have implications for Uganda and U.S. engagement.86 Health assistance has dominated the U.S. aid portfolio in Uganda for over two decades. Per the State Department, “U.S. assistance has contributed to Uganda’s reduction in maternal and child health deaths, improved life expectancy, and helped Uganda move toward HIV epidemic control.”87 In his March 4, 2025 address to a joint session of Congress, President Trump mentioned U.S. funding “for social and behavior change in Uganda” among a list of “appalling waste” identified by his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE); House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast has cited U.S. assistance to support LGBT individuals in Uganda as an example of the Biden Administration “imposing their far-left-ideology onto other nations.”88
Some implementers of U.S.-funded health programs in Uganda have reported that the suspension of U.S. funding in late January 2025 has constrained their ability to maintain programs, despite public directives from the Secretary of State to continue life-saving activities, and reports suggest some programs have since been terminated.89 The Trump Administration has not published data on how much assistance previously obligated for Uganda has been affected by the terminations, but the Uganda AIDS Commission assesses that up to 29,000 local health workers could lose their jobs as a result.90 World Health Organization (WHO) officials indicated in early February 2025 that they may have to cut a quarter of their emergency response budget due to the U.S. withdrawal from the WHO, with near-term implications for emergency programs in Uganda to contain Ebola and other infectious diseases.91 The reported termination of U.S. funding for Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which purchases vaccines for children in low-income countries, may also have major ramifications for Uganda, which has been a leading Gavi beneficiary.92
The Trump Administration’s aid cuts and decision to shut down the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are occurring as some other major donors are also reducing their foreign aid funding.93 Some observers warn that China and Russia may seek to exploit the situation to increase their influence.94In Uganda, China’s ambassador has sought to contrast his country’s aid and economic cooperation with the U.S. cuts, asserting in March 2025 that “China believes that big countries should honor their commitment and fulfil their due responsibilities” and announcing new food assistance for the food insecure northeast.95 Russia has made Uganda a focal point for its health diplomacy in Africa, and in late February its embassy publicized the deployment of a team of Russian specialists to support Uganda’s Ebola response. 96 In 2024, Russia, which has accused the U.S. military of using laboratories in Africa to develop biological weapons, held its first Russian-African International Conference on Combating Biological Threats in Uganda.97
The State Department has not published details on which U.S.-funded programs in Uganda have been retained or terminated, but press reports, court filings, and accounts from implementers highlight some reported impacts of the U.S. funding disruption in Uganda. Several focal areas for U.S. assistance are briefly addressed below.
HIV/AIDS and TB. Uganda, which has an estimated 1.5 million people living with HIV and a 5.1% adult prevalence rate, has been a leading recipient of assistance under the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) for over two decades.98 The U.S. Embassy in Uganda has reported that PEPFAR has prevented over 600,000 HIV-related deaths and 500,000 HIV infections, including the potential infection of over 230,000 babies, in Uganda.99PEPFAR has funded anti-retroviral therapy (ART) for nearly 1.4 million HIV-positive Ugandans annually. U.S. funding accounts for 55% of Uganda’s total HIV/AIDS response (which is 80% foreign donor-funded), per UNAIDS, which reported in March 2025 that all facilities providing ART in the country were operating at reduced capacity, and some had stopped services, due to the disruption of U.S. funding.100 UNAIDS has also reported that the funding disruption has affected HIV testing services and reduced adherence to protocols to prevent mother-to-child transmission. The funding disruption has reportedly affected TB prevention, diagnosis, and treatment in Uganda, where U.S. assistance has supported TB preventative therapy for nearly 100,000 people.101 The head of UNAIDS, who is Ugandan (and who is married to imprisoned opposition politician Kizza Besigye), has warned that HIV/AIDS could surge in the coming years if the U.S. cuts persist.102
Malaria. Malaria is the leading cause of mortality and morbidity in Uganda, which has the world’s highest malaria incidence rate and has been a focus country for the U.S. President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI). U.S. assistance has reportedly annually protected over three million Ugandans through mosquito abatement programs, according to the U.S. Embassy, which reported that as of 2024 mortality in children under five had decreased by 41% since PMI activities started in Uganda in 2005.103 Press reports suggest malaria prevention and treatment programs in Uganda have been affected by the disruption of U.S. funding, with spraying ahead of the rainy season suspended in February and some contracts terminated.104
Ebola Response. The United States has long played a leading role in helping Uganda respond to infectious disease outbreaks, including Ebola. Uganda’s current Ebola outbreak began in January 2025 and involves the “Sudan” strain of the virus, for which there are no U.S. Food and Drug Administration-approved vaccines or treatments. Cases have been confirmed in the densely inhabited capital city, Kampala, home to an estimated two million people, and at multiple health facilities—raising the risk of large-scale transmission. U.S. officials reportedly assessed that Uganda lacked sufficient laboratory supplies, diagnostic equipment, and protective gear for the response.105 In late February 2025, U.S. presidential advisor Elon Musk acknowledged that Administration officials had “accidentally cancelled” emergency response support for the outbreak, but asserted that it was restored immediately, with “no interruption.”106 USAID global health officials, however, have stated that while a waiver was granted for support to the Ebola response, as of late March 2025 no funds had been disbursed, and USAID staffing cuts and directives regarding engagement with WHO further hampered U.S. coordination.107 USAID officials have reported that, as a result, implementers lacked funding to screen for Ebola at Uganda’s main international airport—near Kampala—or move personal protective equipment from Kenya to Uganda to protect health workers. The U.S. Embassy appeared to counter these reports in mid-April 2025, asserting that the United States had provided technical support to Uganda “since the first day of the outbreak” and had provided “robust” contributions for the response totaling over $ 6 million, including the donation of antibody treatments to help manage any new cases.108 Trump Administration directives have reportedly restricted coordination between the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which has an office in Uganda, and the WHO, although according to the CDC, its staff have been cleared to speak “one-on-one” with WHO counterparts related to Ebola in Uganda.109
Refugees. The U.S. aid suspension has affected humanitarian programs in Uganda, including assistance for Africa’s largest refugee population, according to UN agencies.110 Refugee programs in the region were already facing funding shortfalls due to rising global displacement and competing demands for donor funds, and Uganda faces the prospect of a surge of new refugees in 2025 as security conditions deteriorate in DRC and South Sudan.111 UNHCR has reported that as of late February 2025 donors had contributed roughly 11% of the $361 million needed for the year to support refugees in Uganda. The United States has routinely provided over half of all refugee aid in the country.
Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance. Trump Administration cuts to U.S. assistance programs supporting civil society, human rights, and democracy have implications for Uganda, in the context of shrinking civic space, corruption, and the forthcoming 2026 elections. Ugandan civil society groups slated to conduct voter education and programs to mitigate electoral violence report that their activities have been affected by the disruption of U.S. funding, as well as by European aid cuts.112 Groups in Uganda supporting shelters to protect LGBT persons from homelessness and violence have also reportedly lost funding.113 As of late March 2025, programs to combat torture, support transitional justice, and monitor and counter disinformation in Uganda have reportedly been terminated. One of the largest anti-corruption programs in the country was also among the USAID agreements reportedly terminated, according to court filings.114
For endnotes see the original article
- About the author: Lauren Ploch Blanchard is a Specialist in African Affairs
- Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) (PDF)
